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SETTING ASIDE ENTRIES OF DEFAULT: SOUTH
CAROLINA SHOULD REQUIRE A REASON
I. INTRODUCTION
An entry of default officially records a party's "failure to answer or
otherwise respond."1 For "good cause," a court can set aside an entry of default
and permit the action to proceed.2 In 1989, the South Carolina Court of
Appeals established three factors to be considered in determining whether good
cause exists to grant relief from an entry of default.3 These factors, known as
the "Wham factors," examine the timing of the motion for relief, the merit of
the defaulting party's defense, and the degree of prejudice suffered by the other
party if relief is granted.4 Wham does not require the party seeking relief to
present a reason, excuse, or explanation for the default. In three recent
opinions, the South Carolina Court of Appeals has inconsistently applied the
Wham factors, at times requiring some degree of reason or excuse before
setting aside the entry of default.5 Relief from an entry of default is within the
discretion of the trial court, but an error of law or lack of evidentiary support
for the relief is grounds for reversal.6 This inconsistent application of the
factors to be examined when considering a motion to set aside a default entry
confuses the bar and increases the likelihood of reversal on appeal. This
Comment analyzes the court of appeals' recent variations on the Wham factors
and recommends that a threshold reason explaining the default should be
required before a court analyzes the Wham factors.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the default process,
discusses the rules for opening both an entry of default and a default judgment,
and reviews the Wham factors. Part III analyzes recent court of appeals
decisions that have applied inconsistent standards for setting aside entries of
default. Part IV argues that courts should require a showing of the reason for
the default before setting aside an entry of default. Part V recommends a
method for evaluating the justification offered for reversing the entry of
default. This Comment concludes by suggesting that the reason for the default
should serve a threshold function to be considered before analysis of the Wham
factors.
I. JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 440 (2d ed. 1996).
2. S.C. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
3. Wham v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 298 S.C. 462, 465,381 S.E.2d 499, 501-02 (Ct.
App. 1989).
4. Id. at 465, 381 S.E.2d at 502.
5. See discussion infra Part III.
6. Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S.C. 372, 374-75, 360 S.E.2d 535, 536-37 (Ct. App. 1987).
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II. DEFAULT PROCESS AND RULES
A. Default Process
The path to obtaining a judgment by default is usually a two-step
procedure requiring the entry of default and a subsequent default judgment.
An entry of default is simply "the ministerial act recognizing that a party has
not completed a required action in the time provided under the rules."8 The
clerk will enter default for "fail[ure] to plead or otherwise defend as provided
by the[] rules."9 Entries of default can result from failure to meet pleading
deadlines, comply with rules, or appear in court, among other reasons.' If the
claim involves a liquidated or sum certain amount, then, on motion of the
entitled party, the court can enter a default judgment against the defaulting
party after the entry of default."' However, in claims involving an unliquidated
amount, the non-defaulting party must apply for the default judgment, and the
court will generally conduct a damages hearing to ascertain the measure of
recovery before entering the default judgment. 2 Accordingly, when the claim
is for an unascertained amount, the entry of default merely serves as an
"interlocutory act,"' 3 while the default judgment reflects the "final disposition
of the case."' 4
B. Setting Aside the Entry of Default and the Default Judgment
State and federal rules provide mechanisms to set aside both an entry of
default and a default judgment. Rule 55(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that for "good cause shown the court may set aside an entry
of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it
aside in accordance with Rule 60(b)."'" Opening an entry of default erases the
entry made in the courthouse file book and "allows a defaulting defendant to
file an answer in the pending action."' 6 While Rule 55(c) provides the good
cause standard for opening entries of default, Rule 60(b) specifies the standard
for setting aside a default judgement.' Rule 60(b) permits the court to "relieve
7. S.C. R. Civ. P. 55.
8. FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 436; see West v. Marko, 541 S.E.2d 226,230 (N.C. Ct. App.
200 1) (noting that entry of default deems allegations admitted and "denies the responding party
the opportunity to answer the complaint").
9. S.C. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
10. 10A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2692, at
84 (3d ed. 1998).
I1. S.C.R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
12. S.C. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2).
13. Estate of Teel v. Darby, 500 S.E.2d 759, 762 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
14. WRIGHTETAL.,Supra note 10, § 2692, at 84.
15. See also FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) (stating the same rule).
16. West v. Marko, 504 S.E.2d 571, 573 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
17. Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S.C 372, 374, 360 S.E.2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1987).
[Vol. 54:477
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a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: 1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable
neglect; 2) newly discovered evidence ... ; 3) fraud... ; 4) the judgment is
void; 5) [a satisfied judgment]."' 8
When applying the vague good cause requirement of Rule 55(c) for
opening a default judgment, courts often look to the more articulated
"excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b). ' However, courts are more lenient
in setting aside an entry of default than they are in reversing a default
judgment. In considering a Rule 55(c) motion, the court exercises a "broader,
more liberal discretion""0 than the "more rigorous"'" standard of a Rule 60(b)
motion. The difference in scrutiny applied to each motion reflects the nature
of each action. Rule 55(c) reverses an interlocutory clerical annotation, while
Rule 60(b) upsets a final judgment. The opening of default judgments
"destroys the finality of the judgment and is contrary to the strong policy that
litigation should be concluded and the parties be able to rely on judgments that
have been obtained."22 Thus, one seeking to open a default judgment under
Rule 60(b) bears a "heavier burden" than one attempting to set aside an entry
of default under Rule 55(c)."
C. Conflicting Policies Behind What Constitutes Good Cause
In defining the good cause that Rule 55(c) requires for setting aside an
entry of default, courts confront conflicting policies. The South Carolina Court
of Appeals has held that Rule 55(c) should be "liberally construed to promote
justice and dispose of cases on the merits."24 South Carolina favors "the
disposition of issues on their merits rather than on technicalities."25 A
"preference for trials on the merits" suggests a lenient interpretation of good
18. S.C. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (emphasis added).
19. See William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, What Constitutes "Good Cause" Allowing
Federal Court to Relieve Party of His Default Under Rule 55(c) of Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 29 A.L.R. FED. 7, 14 (1976); see also Singh v. Mortensun, 30 P.3d 853, 857 (Colo.
Ct. App. 2001) (Roy, J., concurring) (illustrating the confusion surrounding standards for Rule
55(c) motions). In Singh the majority defined "good cause" in terms of "excusable neglect," 30
P.3d at 856-57; the concurring opinion noted that "good cause" was a more lenient standard than
the "excusable neglect" standard of Rule 60(b) and rejected the majority's commingling of the two
standards. Id. at 857-58.
20. Top Value Homes, Inc. v. Harden, 319 S.C. 302, 306, 460 S.E.2d 427, 429 (Ct. App.
1995).
21. Ricks, 293 S.C. at 374, 360 S.E.2d at 536; see also RC Assocs. v. Regency Ventures,
Inc., 432 S.E.2d 394,398 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993) (noting the "showing required to set aside an entry
of default is less stringent than that required to set aside a default judgment").
'22. FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 440.
23. Palmetto Fed. Sav. Bank of S.C. v. Indus. Valley Title Ins. Co., 756 F. Supp. 925, 931
(D.S.C. 1991).
24. Dixon v. Besco Eng'g, Inc., 320 S.C. 174, 178,463 S.E.2d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 1995).
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cause that will readily permit reversal of entries of default in meritorious
cases.26 On the other hand, court deadlines and rules "serve important social
goals, and a party should not be permitted to flout them with impunity."27
Respect for judicial guidelines and judicial economy and efficiency suggests
a more stringent interpretation of good cause to make setting aside entries of
default more difficult than the lenient standard outlined in Wham.
D. Traditional South Carolina Factors Considered for a Rule 55(c)
Motion
In 1989, the South Carolina Court of Appeals established a framework for
determining when a defaulting party has shown good cause for setting aside an
entry of default. In Wham v. Shearson Lehman Brothers28 the court of appeals
reprimanded the trial court for incorrectly applying Rule 60(b)'s "excusable
neglect" standard to a defendant's Rule 55(c) motion.29 Remanding the case for
reconsideration, the court directed the trial court to note three factors in
considering whether to relieve the defendant from the entry of default: "(1) the
timing of [defendant's] motion for relief [after the entry of default]; (2) whether
[defendant] has a meritorious defense; and (3) the degree of prejudice to [the
non-defaulting party] if relief is granted. 3° Although the court noted that trial
courts "shall consider" these factors, the opinion was unclear whether the
Wham factors are the exclusive considerations or just some of the factors that
should be considered.3 ' The Wham court did not explicitly require an
examination of the reason, justification, or excuse for the defaulting party's
failure to respond in a timely manner. Subsequent decisions have reiterated the
three Wham factors as indicia of good cause.32
The court cited two sources for the Wham factors: Wright, Miller and
Kane's Federal Practice and Procedure, and Lightsey and Flanagan's South
Carolina Civil Procedure.3a The Wright treatise lists only the three factors
prescribed by the Wham court,34 but Lightsey and Flanagan include "the
reasons for the failure to act promptly" as a factor relevant to a Rule 55(c)
26. Palmetto Fed. Sav. Bank, 756 F. Supp. at 931 (quoting Augusta Fiberglass Coatings, Inc.
v. Fodor Contracting Corp., 843 F.2d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1988)).
27. Brown v. Lifford, 524 S.E.2d 587, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Howell v.
Haliburton, 205 S.E.2d 617, 619 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974)).
28. 298 S.C. 462, 381 S.E.2d 499 (Ct. App. 1989).
29. Id. at 465, 381 S.E.2d at 501.
30. Id., 381 S.E.2d at 502.
31. Seeid.,381 S.E.2dat 501.
32. See Maxwell v. Genez, 350 S.C. 563, 568-69, 567 S.E.2d 496, 499 (Ct. App. 2002);
Weeks v. Drawdy (In re Weeks), 329 S.C. 251, 259, 495 S.E.2d 454, 459 (Ct. App. 1997); Top
Value Homes, Inc. v. Harden, 319 S.C. 302, 306, 460 S.E.2d 427, 429 (Ct. App. 1995).
33. Wham, 298 S.C. at 465, 381 S.E.2d at 502.
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inquiry." Prior to the most recent spate of Rule 55(c) opinions, which are
discussed below, only one state court decision noted the discrepancy. In 1994,
the South Carolina Court of Appeals included a reason requirement in addition
to the three Wham factors as relevant to the determination of good cause. 6
III. INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE WHAM FACTORS
Recent decisions by the court of appeals have applied various permutations
of the Wham factors in deciding whether good cause exists for relief under
Rule 55(c), providing trial courts and the bar unclear guidance on the
applicable standards. This inconsistency leaves trial courts and the bar guessing
about the proper standards to apply, and the application of different standards
causes inconsistent results in both trial and appellate courts.
In May 2001, the court evaluated the reason for the default, as well as the
three Wham factors, in considering a Rule 60(b) motion. In Hill v. Dotts37 the
court affirmed the denial of a motion for relief from a default judgment.38 The
court found the defendant's "failure to understand the legal process" to be an
insufficient reason to qualify as excusable neglect under Rule 60(b).39 The
court noted that Lightsey and Flanagan's four factors, including the reason
requirement, "were originally utilized to help determine whether an entry of
default should be set aside" and were "applicable to both" Rule 55(c) and Rule
60(b) motions.' The court cited Wham for the proposition that the four factors
should also be used in evaluating a Rule 55(c) motion.41
The June 2002 court of appeals decision in Maxwell v. Genez" ignored the
reason requirement and focused solely on the three Wham factors. In Maxwell
the court reversed the denial of a plaintiffs Rule 6(b) motion for enlargement
of time.43 The plaintiff failed to meet a deadline because of a mixup resulting
from a new paralegal in the office of plaintiff's counsel.' The court noted the
35. HARRY M. LIGHTSEY & JAMES F. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 82
(1985).
36. N.H. Ins. Co. v. Bey Corp., 312 S.C. 47,50,435 S.E.2d 377,379 (Ct. App. 1993). The
court used the four factors enumerated in LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN, supra note 35, in deciding a
Rule 60(b) motion but noted that the same factors were relevant for Rule 55(c) motions.
37. 345 S.C. 304, 547 S.E.2d 894 (Ct. App. 2001).
38. Id. at 311, 547 S.E.2d at 898.
39. Id., 547 S.E.2d at 897.
40. Id. at 3!0 n. 1,547 S.E.2d at 897 n. 1 (emphasis omitted). One month after Hill, the court
of appeals reiterated its search for both a reason and the Wham factors when considering a Rule
60(b) motion. See Mictronics, Inc. v. S.C. Dept. of Revenue, 345 S.C. 506, 511,548 S.E.2d 223,
226 (Ct. App. 2001). However, in Mictronics, the court did not specifically note that the same
factors could be applied to a Rule 55(c) motion. Id.
41. Hill, 345 S.C. at 310, 547 S.E.2d at 897.
42. 350 S.C. 563, 567 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 2002).
43. Id. at 572,567 S.E.2d at 501. Rule 6(b)(2) permits the court to extend deadlines after the
expiration of a specified period for "good cause" shown. The good cause standard of Rule 6(b)
is the same standard as good cause under Rule 55(c). See FLANAGAN, supra note 1, at 440.
44. Maxwell, 350 S.C. at 566, 567 S.E.2d at 498.
2002]
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good cause standard of Rule 6(b) "is the same standard applied... pursuant to
Rule 55(c)."4s In its good cause review, the court relied exclusively on the three
Wham factors, finding the plaintiff satisfied Wham and thus warranted relief.
The court did not mention that a reason for the default was an essential element
for finding good cause.
Fifteen days following Maxwell, the court of appeals abandoned the Wham
factors and searched only for a reason behind the default in considering a Rule
55(c) motion. In Pilgrim v. Miller" the court, on rehearing of its earlier
decision in the same case, affirmed the denial of Rule 55(c) relief to a
defendant whose insurance company failed to answer timely.47 After the
defendant delivered the suit papers to her insurer, she did not inquire further
about the case." Although the court mentioned the Wham factors, it focused its
analysis on the lack of reason for the default: "[B]ecause no explanation was
offered for [the insurer's] failure to respond to the complaint, we find no abuse
of discretion here and affirm the trial court's refusal to set aside the default."
49
In affirming the trial court's finding of "no specific reason.., for the lack of
response to the Summons and Complaint," the court noted the defendant's
attempted explanation: "I've got no excuse .... I have no idea [why a
response was not given] and I have no way of telling because no one knows.""°
The court did not address or examine any of the Wham factors.
Within a thirteen month period, the court changed the elements of its good
cause analysis from Wham factors plus a reason, to Wham factors alone, and
then to a reason alone. These conflicting standards for relief from an entry of
default make it difficult for the bench and the bar to consistently resolve Rule
55(c) applications. For example, if the Pilgrim court had applied the factors
used by the Maxwell court (only the three Wham factors), then the court would
likely have reached a different conclusion.5 Conversely, if the Maxwell court
45. Id. at 568, 567 S.E.2d at 499.
46. 350 S.C. 637, 567 S.E.2d 527 (Ct. App. 2002).
47. Id. at 642, 567 S.E.2d at 529. Earlier, in January 2002, the court of appeals considered
the same case, yet reversed the entry of default. Pilgrim v. Miller, No. 3435, 2002 S.C. App.
LEXIS 4 (Ct. App. Jan. 14, 2002). In its first consideration of the case, the court held the
defendant-insured had demonstrated good cause by conferring with a lawyer and giving the suit
papers to her insurer. Id. at *2. The court seemingly held that the party's duty ends with delivery
of papers to the insurer: "Once an insurer is made aware of a pending court action against its
insured, the insured should be able to rely on the insurer to protect his or her rights." Id. In May
2002, the court of appeals re-heard the issue and held thatno good cause existed. Pilgrim, 350 S.C.
at 642, 567 S.E.2d at 529.
48. Final BriefofRespondent at 7, Pilgrim v. Miller, 350 S.C. 637,567 S.E.2d 527 (Ct. App.
2002) (No. 00-CP-42-0458).
49. Pilgrim, 350 S.C. at 642, 567 S.E.2d at 529.
50. Id. at 641, 567 S.E.2d at 529.
51. In Pilgrim all three Wham factors apparently were satisfied. The defaulting party filed
its motion to open the entry of default less than two months after the entry was executed.
Respondent's Brief at 5, Pilgrim (No. 00-CP-42-0458). It is unlikely the plaintiff suffered any
prejudice by the two month delay, considering over three years had already passed since the
accident. Id. at 2. Defendant apparently met the meritorious defense threshold, alleging that much
[Vol. 54: 477
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had applied the Pilgrim standard (reason alone), then the outcome is
uncertain."
The shifting standards to adjudicate a Rule 55(c) motion make it difficult
for a trial court to anticipate how the court of appeals will rule on appeal and
present attorneys with contradictory requirements for relief. This Comment
suggests that courts include analysis of the reason or explanation for the default
as a threshold consideration for Rule 55(c) applications and proposes a
methodology for evaluating the merit of that reason.
IV. RULE 5 5(C) MOTIONS SHOULD REQUIRE A SHOWING OF A REASON FOR THE
DEFAULT
South Carolina courts should consider the defaulting party's reason or
justification for the failure to timely respond as a factor when deciding Rule
55(c) motions. Good cause suggests an explanation for the delay, and reliance
on the Wham factors alone fails to consider the policy justification for opening
an entry of default.
A. Natural Meaning of Good Cause Requires a Reason
The text of Rule 55(c) requires a showing of "good cause" to set aside an
entry of default.53 Good cause suggests a reason or justification; legal
dictionaries define the term as a "legally sufficient reason" which "show[s] why
a request should be granted or an action excused."54 Good cause "requires the
moving party to provide an explanation for the default or to give reasons why
vacation of the default entry would serve the interests of justice.""5
Accordingly, the good cause requirement embodies both the reason for the
default and the justification for setting aside the entry; if the explanation for the
default is unacceptable, then there is no justification to reverse. The Wham
factors fail to address the cause or explanation of the default in only
considering the promptness of the motion for relief after the entry of default,
the defaulting party's defense, and the possible resulting prejudice.
B. Other Jurisdictions' Conceptions of Good Cause Include a Reason
Other jurisdictions whose rules include a good cause standard for opening
entries of default consider the reason or circumstances for failure to timely
of the plaintiffs medical bills related to another accident. Final Brief of Appellant at 10-14,
Pilgrim v. Miller, 350 S.C. 637, 567 S.E.2d 527 (Ct. App. 2002) (No. 00-CP-42-0458).
52. In Maxwell v. Genez the plaintiff failed to meet a deadline due to a paralegal mix-up. 350
S.C. 563, 566, 567 S.E.2d 496, 498 (Ct. App. 2002). Applying Pilgrim to the facts in Maxwell,
relief could be granted if the court determined that the mix-up constituted good cause.
53. S.C. R. Civ. P. 55(c).
54. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added).
55. WRIGHTETAL., supra note 10, § 2696, at 141.
2002]
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respond. 6 North Carolina's good cause requirement implicitly examines who
was responsible for the default.57 While Georgia's default statute does not
specifically require a good cause for opening a prejudgment default, Georgia
courts nonetheless require "some legal excuse for failing to answer."58
Notwithstanding their generally more liberal approach to opening entries
of default, federal courts in South Carolina recognize the necessity of showing
a "reason" in Rule 55(c) motions. In Palmetto Federal Savings Bank of South
Carolina v. Industrial Valley Title Insurance Co. 9 the district court reviewed
the Fourth Circuit's standards for Rule 55(c) motions and concluded that
"'good cause' should also address why the defendant was tardy in responding
to the plaintiff's complaint."6° The federal courts have interpreted the rules for
opening a default judgment more broadly than the state courts.61 It would
indeed be unusual if the federal system had a more strict standard to open an
entry of default than South Carolina state courts, given the federal courts' more
lenient propensity to reverse default judgments.
C. The Wham Factors are an Inadequate Test for Good Cause
The three Wham factors alone are an insufficient guide for determining
whether to set aside an entry of default. As indicia of equity, the Wham factors'
limited scope is too easy to satisfy. It is perhaps no coincidence that the South
Carolina state court decisions applying only the Wham factors almost always
set aside the entries of default.62 If Rule 55(c) intended to be a perfunctory
standard, then relief would likely be a matter of right.63 However, the South
56. See DeFillippo v. Neil, 51 P.3d 1183, 1189 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (requiring good cause
and looking for whether there is '"good cause' for failing to answer"); Multiple Resort Ownership
Plan, Inc. v. Design-Build-Manage, Inc., 45 P.3d 647,651 (Wyo. 2002) (requiring good cause and
analyzing it as a "reason for relief').
57. Auto. Equip. Distribs., Inc. v. Petroleum Equip. & Serv., Inc., 361 S.E.2d 895, 896-97
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (opening entry of default after noting the defendant's diligence in keeping
abreast of the case negated the attorney's negligence).
58. Conseco Fin. Servicing Corp. v. Hill, 556 S.E.2d 468, 475 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001). In
Conseco the court refused to open a prejudgment default after the insurer "temporarily misplaced"
the complaint. Id. at 471.
59. 756 F. Supp. 925 (D.S.C. 1991).
60. Id. at 934; see also Carl B. Schultz, Sanctioning Defendants'Non-Willful Delay: The
Failure of Rule 55 and a Proposal for its Reform, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 203, 214 n.56 (1989)
("Courts are required to consider the defendant's excuse for the delay by the express provisions
of Rule 55 .... Both the 'good cause' and the 'excusable neglect' standards look to whether the
default was deliberate or merely negligent.").
61. LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 7.
62. See Maxwell v. Genez, 350 S.C. 563,567 S.E.2d 496 (Ct. App. 2002); Weeks v. Drawdy
(In re Weeks), 329 S.C. 251, 495 S.E.2d 454 (Ct. App. 1997).
63. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-55 (1993) (permitting the reversal of a prejudgment
default "as a matter of right" within fifteen days of default).
[Vol. 54: 477
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Carolina Court of Appeals has repeatedly emphasized that trial courts have
broad discretion in determining Rule 55(c) motions.64
The Wham factors' low level of scrutiny conflicts with the policy
considerations behind Rule 55(c).6" Although South Carolina courts have held
that the rule should be "liberally construed to see that justice is promoted and
to strive for disposition of cases on their merits,"66 the specter of default is a
useful tool: "The threat of judgment by default serves as an incentive to
meet ' a "standard of diligence in observing the courts' rules of procedure.""
Without the realistic threat of default, "the sanctions for noncompliance would
lose their deterrent effect." '69 Because the Wham factors will almost always
permit the opening of an entry of default, the deterrent effect of default entries
in South Carolina is muted: "[I]f default is to be an effective sanction, relief
under Rule 55(c) cannot be granted too readily."7 With the threat of sanction
abated, parties are more likely to flout court deadlines, taxing judicial economy
and efficiency. Accordingly, an overly permissive standard to adjudicate Rule
55(c) motions undermines the purpose of the default process.
As an analytical tool, the Wham factors are vague and could allow abuse
of motions to open entries of default. Because the Wham factors do not take
into account the reasons for the default, a tactical failure to timely respond
could go undetected. A purposeful default that otherwise met the three Wham
factors would be set aside, essentially rewarding the strategy.71
64. See Maxwell, 350 S.C. at 568,567 S.E.2d at 499; Weeks, 329 S.C. at 259,495 S.E.2d at
459.
65. See discussion supra Part II.C.
66. Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S.C. 372, 374-75, 360 S.E.2d 535, 536 (Ct. App. 1987).
67. Multiple Resort Ownership Plan, Inc. v. Design-Build-Manage, Inc., 45 P.3d 647,655
(Wyo. 2002) (quoting Vanasse v. Ramsay, 847 P.2d 993, 1000 (Wyo. 1993)).
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting Davis v. Immediate Med. Servs., Inc., 684 N.E.2d 292, 296-97 (Ohio
1997)).
70. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2693, at 99.
71. For example, a defendant could willfully fail to answer or respond in order to control or
limit the cost of litigation. See Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Toronado Sys. of America, 687 F.2d 182,
185 (7th Cir. 1982). Yet if the defendant made a motion to set aside the entry of default soon after
the entry was recorded, then the court would likely find the Rule 55(c) motion timely. Because the
delay created by the default was brief, a court would likely find that the default does not prejudice
the plaintiff. But see WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2699, at 169 (listing various ways litigant
could be prejudiced by delay, such as "thwart[ing] plaintiffs recovery," losing evidence, or
making discovery difficult). Assuming the defendant had a meritorious defense, the Wham factors
would likely excuse this default despite the defendant's willful delay.
2002]
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D. Wham Court Reasoning
The Wham court erred in omitting the reason requirement from its list of
factors to be considered in a Rule 55(c) motion. As noted above, the court of
appeals derived the Wham factors from two sources: Lightsey and Flanagan's
South Carolina Civil Procedure, and Wright, Miller and Kane's Federal
Practice & Procedure. While both sources included the three Wham factors,
Lightsey and Flanagan also included the defaulting party's reason as a factor
to consider.72 The court perhaps omitted Lightsey and Flanagan's reason factor
by mistakenly equating "reason" with the "excusable neglect" requirement that
is contained in Rule 60(b) but not in Rule 55(c). Yet the absence of a
comparable "excusable neglect" term in Rule 55(c) does not preclude a Rule
55(c) inquiry from examining the party's reason, justification, or explanation
for the default. Procedural similarities between the two motions suggest that
Rule 55(c) maintains a "reason" standard of its own; as a "practical matter, the
same factors are relevant in both" Rule 55(c) and Rule 60(b) motions.73 Rule
60(b)'s excusable neglect requirement inherently requires a showing of the
justification for the default. If similar factors are relevant in both motions, Rule
55(c) should also require consideration of the moving party's reason for the
default.
V. EVALUATING THE REASON THROUGH A WILLFUL AND DILIGENCE LENS
A party's bare assertion that he has a reason or justification for a default
is, of course, insufficient to reverse an entry of default. After the reason is
established, a court should deny relief for willful conduct or lack of diligence.
This entails a two-step filtering process. Initially, a court should determine
whether the delay was willful or in bad faith; if so, a court should reject the
Rule 55(c) motion. Then, if a court finds that the default is non-willful, it
should consider the moving party's diligence before the default. In this manner,
the court can evaluate the defaulting party's reason for default to determine if
good cause exists for setting aside the entry. A party's diligent attention to the
legal proceeding should strongly encourage a court to reverse an entry of
default.
A. Willful Defaults
As a threshold consideration, a court should inquire whether the defaulting
party's delay was a purposeful, willful act. An intentional delay designed to
72. LIGHTSEY & FLANAGAN, supra note 35, at 82; WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 34, § 2694,
at 493. Federal courts in South Carolina do require a reason when considering relief from the entry
of default. See Palmetto Fed. Say. Bank of S.C. v. Indus. Valley Title Ins. Co., 756 F. Supp. 925,
934 (D.S.C. 1991).
73. LIGHTSEY & FLANGAN, supra note 35, at 82.
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gain a tactical advantage reflects "obstructionist tactics [that] hinder[]"74 the
judicial process and undermine judicial economy and efficiency." Courts in
numerous jurisdictions have noted how willful defaults to gain time or to
prejudice the plaintiff evidence a disregard for the judicial process.76 Rejection
of Rule 55(c) motions when the delay stems from a willful act is a proper
sanction and an effective deterrent. However, because few cases will present
evidence of the defaulting party's obstructionist intent, a second consideration
will generally be required.
B. The Diligence Analysis of Rule 55(c)
1. Diligence and Imputed Negligence
Assuming a court finds no evidence of willful default, a court should then
closely examine the reason in order to determine whether the defaulting party
was "diligent in pursuit of [the] matter" before the entry of default." This
inquiry considers the "degree of attention or inattention shown by [the
defaulting party] to be a particularly compelling factor" in determining whether
to reverse an entry of default.7" Such an analysis examines the party's actions
prior to the default, and it should focus on the action of the defaulting party,
rather than the party's attorney or insurer. The focus should be on the
defaulting party because that party will bear the monetary burden of the
judgment, as well as any preclusive effect that the judgment may have on other
claims or issues. The equitable nature of Rule 55(c) motions suggests a
consideration of the defendant's own actions leading up to the default.79
However, many entries of default stem from mistakes by the defendant's
attorney or insurance company."0 South Carolina courts "have consistently held
that the negligence of an attorney or insurance company is imputable to a
74. Men's Sportswear, Inc. v. Sasson Jeans, Inc. (In re Men's Sportswear, Inc.), 834 F.2d
1134, 1139 (2d Cir. 1987).
75. The Second Circuit considers whether the moving party's delay was willful when
deciding a Rule 55(c) motion. See Enron Oil Corp. v. Diakuhara, 10 F.3d 90, 96 (2d Cir. 1993);
Niepoth v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F.R.D. 111, 112 (N.D.N.Y. 1998).
76. See, e.g., Widmer-Baum v. Chandler-Halford, 162 F.R.D. 545,552-53 (N.D. Iowa 1995)
(discussing various federal circuit courts' treatment and consideration of willful defaults).
77. Auto. Equip. Distribs., Inc. v. Petroleum Equip. & Serv., Inc., 361 S.E.2d 895, 896-97
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
78. Brown v. Lifford, 524 S.E.2d 587, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
79. See Ricks v. Weinrauch, 293 S.C. 372,374,360 S.E.2d 535,536 (Ct. App. 1987) (noting
that Rule 55(c) is "liberally construed to see thatjustice is promoted"); FLANAGAN, supra note 1,
at 440 (discussing the equitable nature of Rule 55(c) motions).
80. See Follmer v. Perry, 493 S.E.2d 631, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (insurance agent);
Pinehurst Baptist Church, Inc. v. Murray, 450 S.E.2d 307, 308 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994) (insurance
carrier); Pilgrim v. Miller, 350 S.C. 637, 639, 567 S.E.2d 527, 528 (Ct. App. 2002) (insurance
company); Mitchell Supply Co., Inc. v. Gaffney, 297 S.C. 160,163,375 S.E.2d 321,323 (Ct. App.
1988) (lawyer); Ricks, 293 S.C. at 373, 360 S.E.2d at 536 (insurance agent).
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defaulting litigant,"'" but such a policy should not automatically preclude a
finding of good cause to set aside an entry of default. The South Carolina cases
cited for the imputation of negligence theory deal with efforts to set aside
defaultjudgments, not entries ofdefault. In considering a defaultjudgment that
stemmed from an employer's mistake, the court of appeals has noted the
negligence of an attorney or insurer can be imputed to defaulting defendants. 2
However, defendants against whom an entry of default has been made are not
defaulting defendants.3
Similarly, in Mitchell Supply Company, Inc. v. Gaffney, 4 the Court of
Appeals cited the negligence of the defendant's attorney in denying his motion
to open the default judgment8 Mitchell cited as authority Simon v. Flowers,6
a 1957 case in which the South Carolina Supreme Court also denied a motion
to open a default judgment resulting from the attorney's mistake." However,
entries of default do not signify a default judgment; thus, different standards
should be applied when considering a motion to open an entry of default. As
the Court of Appeals has noted, a court has "greater liberality" in determining
whether to open an entry of default than in overturning a default judgement.88
Furthermore, South Carolina courts have inconsistently applied the
imputed negligence theory to Rule 5 5(c) motions. In Ricks v. Weinrauch89 the
defendant failed to respond after her insurance agent's "closure and
bankruptcy" precluded delivery of the suit papers to the insurer.90 In an attempt
to prevent the default after learning of the insurance agent's problems, the
defendant contacted her attorney twice and her insurer once.91 Noting the
defendant "acted reasonably," the court set aside the entry of default despite the
insurance agent's negligence. 92 However, in Pilgrim v. Miller, the court
imputed an insurer's failure to answer a complaint to the defendant and denied
the Rule 55(c) motion.93 This apparent inconsistency, coupled with the
questionable applicability of the imputed negligence theory to Rule 55(c)
81. Roberts v. Peterson, 292 S.C. 149, 151, 355 S.E.2d 280, 281 (Ct. App. 1987).
82. Id.
83. WRIGHTETAL., supra note 10, § 2682, at 20 ("[A]n entry of default is merely a formal
matter and does not constitute the entry of judgment.").
84. 297 S.C. 160, 375 S.E.2d 321 (Ct. App. 1988).
85. Id. at 165, 375 S.E.2d at 324. In Mitchell the court suggested that the South Carolina
Supreme Court"may wish to reexamine the requirements for setting aside defaultjudgments with
an eye toward liberalizing them to more closely comport with the interpretations" that distinguish
between the negligence of the defendant and the negligence of his lawyer or insurer. Id. at 164 n.2,
375 S.E.2d at 324 n.2.
86. 231 S.C. 545, 99 S.E.2d 391 (1957).
87. Id. at 551, 99 S.E.2d at 394.
88. Hill v. Dotts, 345 S.C. 304, 310 n.1, 547 S.E.2d 894, 897 n.1 (Ct. App. 2001).
89. 293 S.C. 372, 360 S.E.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1987).
90. Id. at 373, 360 S.E.2d at 536.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 375, 360 S.E.2d at 537.
93. Pilgrim v. Miller, 350 S.C. 637, 642, 567 S.E.2d 527, 529 (Ct. App. 2002).
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motions, suggests that the negligence of the defendant's agent is not
necessarily dispositive of good cause.
Even when considering the negligence of the attorney or insurance
company, the defendant's diligence in pursuit of the legal matter reflects an
effort to counteract the agent's misdeeds. In evaluating the party's reason for
default, the court should examine the defendant's responsiveness, attention,
and diligence to the legal matter prior to the default. A showing of commitment
to the matter should appeal to the court's sense of equity and counter-balance
the agent's negligence.94
Furthermore, diligence approximates a reasonable standard of conduct for
parties to a legal action:95 "[P]arties who have been duly served ... are required
to give their defense that attention which a man of ordinary prudence usually
gives his important business." '96 A showing of diligence (or lack thereof)
permits the court to identify the more egregious instances of delay. Mindful of
the state's strong preference for resolution on the merits, only extreme
instances of delay are appropriate for the "drastic remedy" of default.
97 A
drastic sanction should not befall one who acts reasonably. However, a lack of
diligence reflects disregard for judicial efficiency and undermines the purpose
of court deadlines.
South Carolina courts have implicitly noted the defaulting party's efforts
to keep abreast of the suit as a factor when considering whether to set aside the
entry of default. In Ricks v. Weinrauch98 the court of appeals reversed an entry
of default after noting the defaulting party made numerous efforts to contact
both her insurer and attorney about the suit.99 Such efforts contrast sharply with
the actions of the defaulting party in Pilgrim who made no effort to contact her
agent after delivering the suit papers. However, the court did not discuss this
94. See Estate of Teel v. Darby, 500 S.E.2d 759, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no
demonstration of diligence or commitment to "prevent the imputation of the inexcusable
negligence of [the insurer]" to the defendant).
95. See Grant v. Cox, 415 S.E.2d 378, 381 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992) (comparing defendant's
conduct to the actions of a "man of ordinary prudence... [dealing with] his important business
affairs").
96. Kirby v. Asheville Contracting Co., Inc., 180 S.E.2d 407, 410 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971)
(citation omitted); see also Darby, 500 S.E.2d at 764 (quoting Hayes v. Evergo Tel. Co., 397
S.E.2d 325, 330 (N.C. 1990) ("A defendant must give its litigation matters that level of attention
one gives important business matters.").
97. Beard v. Pembaur, 313 S.E.2d 853, 856 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
98. 293 S.C. 372, 360 S.E.2d 535 (Ct. App. 1987).
99. Id. at 375, 360 S.E.2d at 537. In briefs for Pilgrim, the respondent distinguished Ricks
by noting that the defaulting party in Pilgrim had failed to stay apprised of the legal proceeding
because she never followed up after delivering the suit papers to the insurer. Final Brief of
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lack of action in its opinion."' While the court of appeals granted relief in
Ricks, °  it denied the Rule 55(c) motion in Pilgrim."2
2. Neighboring Jurisdictions' Use of Diligence in Rule 55(c)
Motions
Both North Carolina and Georgia courts, as well as the Fourth Circuit,
consider the defendant's diligence when ruling on a motion to open an entry
of default. Like South Carolina, North Carolina's rule concerning the opening
of an entry of default is modeled after Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 3 In deciding whether to set aside an entry of default, North
Carolina courts consider three factors: (1) the defendant's diligence "in pursuit
of th[e] matter;" (2) whether the plaintiff suffered "any harm by virtue of the
delay;" and (3) whether the defendant would suffer "a grave injustice by being
unable to defend the action."'0 4 Summarizing previous cases concerning
motions to open an entry of default, the North Carolina Court of Appeals noted
in a 2000 case that "the degree of attention or inattention shown by the
defendant... [is] a particularly compelling factor."' 5
Georgia's default process lacks a formal entry of default; instead, a case
goes into default upon the failure to file. 6 The defaulting party may open the
default as a matter of right within fifteen days of the deadline, but, after the
fifteen days pass, "the plaintiff at any time thereafter... [is] entitled to verdict
and judgment by default."'0 7 However, at any point prior to the default
judgment, the defaulting party may open the prejudgment default by a showing
of certain conditions and on certain grounds. 8 Under Georgia's default
process,
a prejudgment default may be opened on one of three grounds
if four conditions are met. The three grounds are: (1)
providential cause, (2) excusable neglect, and (3) proper case;
the four [pre]conditions are: (1) showing made under oath,
(2) offer to plead instanter, (3) announcement of ready to
proceed with trial, and (4) setting up a meritorious defense." 9
100. Pilgrim v. Miller, 350 S.C. 637, 641, 567 S.E.2d 527, 528 (Ct. App. 2002).
101. 293 S.C. at 375, 360 S.E.2d at 537.
102. 350 S.C. at 643, 567 S.E.2d at 530.
103. N.C. R. Civ. P. 55(d).
104. Auto. Equip. Distribs., Inc. v. Petroleum Equip. & Serv., Inc., 361 S.E.2d 895,896-97
(N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
105. Brown v. Lifford, 524 S.E.2d 587, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
106. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-55(a) (2002).
107. Id.
108. Id. § 9-11-55(b).
109. Follmer v. Perry, 493 S.E. 2d 631, 632 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (citation omitted).
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The three grounds are broadly defined, and the "proper case" justification
has been characterized to "take in every conceivable case where injustice might
result if the default were not opened."' " To narrow the decision making, courts
also consider the prejudice to the opposing party and whether or not the party
moved promptly to set aside the default."' The Georgia Court of Appeals has
noted that "decisions [considering the opening of pre-judgment defaults] have
focused on the defendant's diligence and the insurer's assurance that it is
handling the case.""'12
Finally, the Fourth Circuit has interpreted good-cause under Rule 55(c) to
include a consideration of the "personal responsibility of the party" and the
difference between instances where the party is at fault and where the attorney
or insurer is to blame." 3 Harmonizing several Fourth Circuit decisions on Rule
55(c), a South Carolina federal district court noted that "[p]articular attention
should be paid to whether the defaulting party or their counsel bears the
responsibility for the delay."'' ' Such factors reflect an interest in the relative
culpability of the defendant versus the culpability of his attorney or insurer.
3. Application of the Diligence Standard
Generally, courts have found diligence and have set aside the entry of
default if the defendant's explanation for the delay reflects that he has been
attentive to his case. When the default is the defendant's fault, the court is less
likely to open the entry of default. In Grant v. Cox"' the North Carolina Court
of Appeals considered a defendant's motion to reverse an entry of default that
resulted from his confusion regarding multiple summons.116 Holding the
defendant to a standard of "ordinary prudence," the court noted that the legal
requirements of the document were plainly stated and denied the motion." 7
Similarly, the Georgia Court of Appeals has denied a motion to open a
prejudgment default after the defendants completely failed to comply with or
respond to any of the requests or orders or to "otherwise participate in the
litigation."' " The "lengthy period of inattention to the litigation" justified the
denial." 9 In Ellis v. Five Star Dodge, Inc."2' the court denied relief after the
110. Boggs Rural Life Ctr., Inc. v. 1OS Capital, Inc., 567 S.E.2d 94,95 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(quoting Axelroad v. Preston, 209 S.E.2d 178, 179 (Ga. 1974)).
111. Albee v. Krasnoff, 566 S.E.2d 455, 458 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (quoting Ford v. St.
Francis Hosp., Inc., 490 S.E.2d 415, 419 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)).
112. Follmer, 493 S.E.2d at 633.
113. United States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 728 (4th Cir. 1982).
114. Palmetto Fed. Sav. Bank of S.C. v. Indus. Valley Title Ins. Co., 756 F. Supp. 925,932
(D.S.C. 1991).
115. 415 S.E.2d 378 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992).
116. Id. at 379-80.
117. Id. at 381.
118. Carter v. Ravenwood Dev. Co., 549 S.E.2d 402, 405 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
119. Id.
120. 529 S.E.2d 904 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000).
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defendants failed to refer the action to their insurer, although they thought they
had.121 The court focused on the fact that the defendants failed to take "any
affirmative action to ensure that an answer was filed in the lawsuit," and that
there was no communication between the defendant and their insurance
carrier: "[T]he defendant did nothing to ensure that the case had been
received by the insurance company or that an answer would be filed. This
Court cannot condone such inaction."
123
However, where the default stems from the action (or lack thereof) of the
defendant's insurer or lawyer, courts generally examine the defendant's
communication and cooperation with the agent for evidence of attentiveness
to the litigation. In Pinehurst Baptist Church v. Murray24 the trial court had
entered an entry of default after the defendant's insurance carrier missed the
deadline to answer. 25 Despite this, the Georgia Court of Appeals granted relief,
noting that the defendant contacted the insurance agent five times and "was
assured that nothing else was required of him."'26 Similarly, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals granted relief from an entry of default, which resulted from
an insurer's mistake, after noting that the defendant "made numerous contacts
with his insurance agent" and "did everything that could reasonably have been
required to demonstrate diligent attention to the case."' 27 In Automotive
Equipment Distributors, Inc. v. Petroleum Equipment & Service, Inc. 2' the
North Carolina Court of Appeals opened an entry of default, which resulted
from defense counsel's error, after noting that the defendant participated in
legal strategy and received an assurance that the lawyer would prepare an
answer. 1
29
It is when the defendant does not follow-up after delivering the suit papers
to his lawyer or insurer that a court is less likely to grant relief. Estate of Teel
v. Darby3" is an example of the typical scenario in which default is entered
after both the defendant's lawyer and insurer failed to answer. 3' In denying
relief, the court noted that the defendant did nothing after turning the legal
matter over to his attorney.3 2 Since the "record [was] devoid of any evidence
of [the defendant's] follow-up," the court denied relief on the basis that the
121. Id. at 905.
122. Id. (emphasis omitted).
123. Id. at 906.
124. 450 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
125. Id. at 308.
126. Id. at 309.
127. Brown v. Lifford, 524 S.E.2d 587, 590 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
128. 361 S.E.2d 895 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
129. Id. at 897; see also Shortnacy v. N. Atlanta Internal Med., P.C., 556 S.E.2d 209, 213
(Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (granting reliefafter default due to insurer's mistake when defendant inquired
as to status of matter and "was assured ... that the matter was being attended to").
130. 500 S.E.2d 759 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
131. Id. at 763-64.
132. Id. at 764.
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party abdicated his duty of attending to the litigation.'33 In denying relief after
an insurer's error, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has noted that the
defendant "took no further action to inquire into the progress of the case" after
delivering suit papers to the insurer. 34 In a similar fact scenario, the court has
faulted the defendant for failing to "pa[y] ... further attention to the lawsuit"
after transmitting the matter to the insurer.3' In other decisions denying relief
from an entry of default when the insurer or attorney is at fault, North Carolina
courts have focused on the defendant's failure to take any action after
delivering the suit to his representative.136 Georgia courts have followed a
similar logic.'37
4. Relationship Between the Willful and Diligence Tests and the
Wham Factors.
In considering a Rule 55(c) motion, the willful and diligence analysis
provides a threshold function. The defaulting party's reason or explanation
must show that the delay was not willful and must demonstrate diligence in
pursuing the case. Consideration is given to the three Wham factors after the
reason passes the willful and diligence tests. One factor, the existence of a
meritorious defense, reflects the practical concern of whether the outcome on
the merits would be any different than the outcome produced by a default
judgment. 38 Therefore, the party moving for relief must demonstrate a
meritorious defense to the action. 39 The remaining two factors, the timeliness
of the motion for relief and the degree of prejudice suffered by the other party,
are related. While there is no express time requirement to file a Rule 55(c)
motion after an entry of default, prompt action will influence the court's
discretionary power because it can reflect the defaulting party's degree of
133. Id.
134. Cabe v. Worley, 536 S.E.2d 328, 330 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
135. Howell v. Haliburton, 205 S.E.2d 617, 618-19 (N.C. Ct. App. 1974).
136. See, e.g., RC Assocs. v. Regecy Ventures, Inc., 432 S.E.2d 394, 399 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (finding the defendants took no action after their attorney withdrew from the case); Pryse
v. Strickland Lumber & Bldg. Supply, Inc., 311 S.E.2d 598, 599 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (finding
defendant never did anything after mailing summons and complaint to company's office in
Atlanta); Bailey v. Gooding, 299 S.E.2d 267,271 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983) ("There is nothing in the
record to indicate what actions defendants took.., to defend the case other than to deliver the suit
papers to the insurance carrier.").
137. See, e.g., Follmer v. Perry, 493 S.E.2d 631, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997) (noting the
defendant "never spoke with the [insurance] agent or received assurance that the insurer was
proceeding with the defense").
138. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2697, at 163.
139. Id. at 156. A majority of courts consider "meritorious defense" to include a
"presentation ofsome factual basis for the supposedly meritorious defense." Id. at 160. The Fourth
Circuit defines "meritorious defense" to comprise "a presentation or proffer of evidence, which,
if believed, would permit either the Court or the jury to find for the defaulting party." United
States v. Moradi, 673 F.2d 725, 727 (4th Cir. 1982).
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attention and urgency to his case.1" Prompt action will also reduce the possible
prejudice to the opposing party. Such prejudice stems from the delay created
by the default; during that time, evidence may be altered or more difficult to
find, and the plaintiff may incur increased litigation costs. 141 Delay alone is "an
inevitable part of the American judicial process and not a sufficient basis for
establishing prejudice. ' 142 Instead, the opposing party must show "evidence of




The current factors that South Carolina courts consider for relief from
entries of default are applied inconsistently, and they inadequately reflect the
concept of good cause. South Carolina courts should require the party
requesting the reversal the entry of default to make a threshold showing of the
reason or justification for his delay. If the delay is found to be willful, then a
denial of relief is appropriate. Absent a willful delay, the court should evaluate
the justification to determine if there was a lack of diligence on the part of the
defaulting party prior to the default. A lack of attention, diligence, or
communication with the defendant's agents suggests that little effort was put
forth in order to stay apprised of the legal matter. This lack of diligence
supports the denial of relief. Conversely, evidence of the party's follow-up and
attention to the matter supports the grant of relief. The court should engage in
the Wham analysis only after this threshold inquiry.
Requiring the moving party to show a reason for the default will deter bad
faith tactical delays and will permit the court to evaluate the reason according
to the willful and diligence tests. The reason factor is not an exact test and does
not supplant the trial court's discretion in considering a Rule 55(c) motion.
Instead, it provides an additional factor for the court to consider in its
discretionary judgment. Requiring the trial court to consider the reason for the
default will add a degree of consistency and predictability now lacking in Rule
55(c) decisions.
Eli A. Poliakoff
140. WRIGHTETAL., supra note 10, § 2698, at 164; see Maxwell v. Genez, 350 S.C. 563,
570, 567 S.E.2d 496, 500 (Ct. App. 2002) (noting the brief, nineteen-day period of time between
the entry of default and the Rule 55(c) motion reflects the defaulting party's "alacrity and
urgency").
141. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 10, § 2699, at 169.
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